SECRET

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

GENERAL CUSHMAN REGRETS THAT HE IS UNABLE TO BE HERE TODAY, TO CONGRATULATE YOU ON THIS AUSPICIOUS OCCASION, AND I AM SORRY FOR YOUR DISAPPOINTMENT -- BUT I HAVE SOME PREVIOUS ACQUAINTANCE WITH THIS SCHOOL AND AM PLEASED TO BE HERE AGAIN TODAY, TO ACT IN HIS STEAD.

CAPTAIN FULLER'S KIND INTRODUCTION REMINDS ME OF THE PRUSSIAN GENERAL WHO COMPLAINED TO FREDERICK THE GREAT THAT IT HAD BEEN A LONG TIME SINCE HE HAD RECEIVED A PROMOTION. THE GENERAL REMINDED THE KING THAT HE HAD SERVED HIM FAITHFULLY IN MANY CAMPAIGNS. THE KING POINTED TO A PACK HORSE THAT HAPPENED TO BE STANDING NEARBY AND REMARKED THAT HE TOO HAD SERVED FAITHFULLY DURING MANY HARD CAMPAIGNS!

I AM A PACK HORSE THIS MORNING. HAPPILY, I HAVE IN MY PACK JUST WHAT GENERAL CUSHMAN WOULD HAVE SAID, HAD HE BEEN HERE. FROM THIS POINT ON, JUST IMAGINE THAT IT IS GENERAL CUSHMAN WHO IS SPEAKING.

WHEN CAPTAIN FULLER INVITED ME TO ADDRESS YOU TODAY, HE LEFT THE TOPIC OPEN. I PROPOSED TO TALK ABOUT "TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE." NOW, THIS IS A PRETTY BROAD TOPIC, AND THE PROBLEM OF IDENTIFYING THE MORE IMPORTANT AND PERSISTENT TRENDS REMINDS ME OF THE DILEMMA OF A YOUNG ARAB PRINCE.

ON HIS TWENTY-FIRST BIRTHDAY HIS FATHER, THE RULER OF AN OIL-RICH SHEIKDOM, GAVE THE BOY A HAREM -- JUST A STARTER KIT OF 50 GIRLS OR SO.

THE NEXT DAY, AN ENVIOUS FRIEND WAS AMAZED TO FIND THE SHEIK'S SON IN A COFFEE HOUSE AT THE LOCAL BAZAAR, SITTING ALONE AND DRINKING LISTLESSLY.

"WHY ARE YOU HANGING AROUND HERE?" THE FRIEND ASKED.
"WITH ALL THOSE LOVELY, LONELY GIRLS WAITING FOR YOU, DON'T
YOU KNOW WHAT TO DO?"

"I KNOW WHAT TO DO, "THE SHEIK'S SON ANSWERED, "I JUST DON'T KNOW WHERE TO START!"

AND SO IT IS WITH "TRENDS IN INTELLIGENCE." THE TOPIC
IS CERTAINLY MORE OPEN TO A SHEIK'S CHOICE OF SUBJECTS THAN
IS THE MATERIAL WHICH THE MEMBERS OF THIS COURSE HAVE COVERED.
BUT IT IS, I BELIEVE, MOST IMPORTANT THAT WE WHO ARE ENGAGED
IN INTELLIGENCE WORK TAKE TIME OUT OCCASIONALLY, STAND BACK

FROM OUR DAY-TO-DAY PROBLEMS, AND ASSESS WHERE WE STAND

AND IN WHAT DIRECTION WE ARE MOVING. ONLY IF WE DO TAKE STOCK

AT REGULAR INTERVALS, CAN WE CHART A COURSE FOR OURSELVES,

INSTEAD OF MERELY REACTING TO AND KEEPING PACE WITH THE

PRESSURES AND PROBLEMS THAT AFFECT US ALL.

SO LET ME TRY TO IDENTIFY FOR YOU SEVERAL OF THE TRENDS WHICH STRIKE ME AS HAVING A SIGNIFICANT AND PERSISTENT INFLUENCE UPON OUR BUSINESS.

I BELIEVE WE SHOULD PUT AT THE TOP OF THIS LIST THE GROWING PROBLEM OF GEOGRAPHICAL ACCESS FOR LOCATING ABROAD OUR INTELLIGENCE BASES AND FACILITIES. A DECADE AGO, THE AMERICAN PRESENCE SERVED AS A REASSURING SYMBOL OF SECURITY TO THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES. BUT AS THE COLD WAR HAS THAWED OUT MORE AND MORE IN THE 1960'S, OUR INSTALLATIONS ON FOREIGN SOIL, INCLUDING INTELLIGENCE FACILITIES, HAVE BECOME LESS WELCOME GUESTS. NOW THE AMERICAN PRESENCE, PARTICULARLY FOR INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES, IS BEING EXPLOITED BY COMMUNIST PROPAGANDISTS AND NATIONALIST AGITATORS WHO PORTRAY IT AS EVIDENCE OF "IMPERIALIST" OR "COLONIALIST" DOMINATION.

CLEARLY WE ARE UNDER INCREASING PRESSURES TO WITHDRAW,

OR REDUCE OUR VISIBILITY, OR TO PAY EVER LARGER "RENTS" IN THE
FORM OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID, OR A LARGER SHARE OF THE
INTELLIGENCE TAKE. NO PARTICULAR INSIGHT IS REQUIRED TO SEE
THAT WE WILL GENERALLY FIND IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO
SECURE ACCESS TO AND USE REAL ESTATE IN COUNTRIES BORDERING

POWERS
COMMUNIST STATES. AS A CONSEQUENCE, WE MUST DEVELOP ALTERNATIVES. THESE INCLUDE TECHNICAL ALTERNATIVES, SUCH AS MOBILE
PLATFORMS, AT SEA, IN THE AIR, AND IN SPACE. ANOTHER TYPE OF
SUBSTITUTE, IN PLACES WHERE WE CAN STILL GET A FOOT IN THE
DOOR, IS MORE EFFICIENT AND LESS CONSPICUOUS INSTALLATIONS
OPERATED BY FEWER PERSONNEL.

MEMBERS

THIS TREND APPLIES TO THE FACILITIES OF ALL PARES OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IN SOME COUNTRIES CIA HAS EXPERIENCED A CHANGE IN WHAT WE CALL "THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT." A GOOD "OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT" IS ONE IN WHICH LOCAL SECURITY AND POLICE FORCES COOPERATE WITH US, OR AT LEAST CLOSE THEIR EYES TO OUR INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE TERRITORY OR FACILITIES OF OUR TARGETS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THEIR ATTITUDE IS OFTEN A CRITICAL FACTOR IN MOUNTING CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS.

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THE CHANGE THAT I ALL	UDED TO CONCERNS CE	RTAIN COUNTRIES WHERE
COOPERATION HAS BEEN	WITHDRAWN OR THE AT	TITUDE HAS BECOME
HOSTILE. I GIVE YOU		AS CURRENT EXAMPLES.

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THIS SHIFT IN ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR FACILITIES AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IS ALSO PART OF A HEIGHTENED SENSITIVITY, ABROAD AS WELL AS IN THE UNITED STATES, TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. PART OF THIS AWARENESS AND HOSTILITY HAS BEEN AROUSED BY INTERNATIONAL PUBLICITY CAUSED BY OUR EFFORTS TO SECURE INTELLIGENCE. THE U-2 SHOOT DOWN OVER THE USSR; THE ATTACK ON THE USS LIBERTY AND THE CAPTURE OF THE PUEBLO: THE FAIRLY NUMEROUS INCIDENTS OVER THE YEARS INVOLVING ELINT AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS THE EC-121 OFF KOREA; THE ARREST AND JAILING OF AGENT PERSONNEL; AND OTHER INTELLIGENCE FLAPS HAVE CAUSED FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND NEWS MEDIA TO BECOME PRETTY TWITCHY WHERE INTELLIGENCE MATTERS ARE CONCERNED. THIS IS NOT TO POINT A FINGER OF FAULT, BUT SIMPLY TO STATE A FACT OF LIFE. WHEN WE RUN RISKS, WE EXPECT ACCIDENTS TO OCCUR.

THIS SENSITIVITY DOES NOT, HOWEVER, STEM FROM INTELLIGENCE INCIDENTS ALONE THE CHANGE IN ATTITUDE IS IN PART, A RESULT OF THE RECOGNITION OF THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF GOOD INTELLIGENCE



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THE TODAY'S WORLD. I'LL COME BACK TO THIS POINT. BUT SUCH

COMMUNIST AGENCIES HAVE ALSO EXPLOITED INTELLIGENCE INCIDENTS

TO THE FULLEST, THROUGH DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE AND PROPAGANDA

CHARGES, AS A PART OF THEIR GENERAL ANTI-U.S. CAMPAIGN.

AND LOCAL COMMUNIST ELEMENTS HAVE AGITATED A GREAT DEAL. THE

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF THE COMMUNIST STATES HAVE TRUMPED-UP

CHARGES OF ESPIONAGE AGAINST INNOCENT WESTERN TOURISTS. THEY

HAVE ALSO MUDDIED THE WATERS THROUGH A CAMPAIGN OF FORGERY AND

VILIFICATION DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. INTELLIGENCE. CIA

ESPECIALLY HAS BEEN THE TARGET OF THIS EFFORT IN THE UNDER
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES. WHETHER THE HOST GOVERNMENT ACTS FROM

GREED, RESENTMENT, OR HOSTILITY, OR IS SIMPLY UNABLE TO STAND

THE HEAT OF OPPOSITION CRITICISM, THE RESULT IS THE SAME -
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT TURNS CHILLY.

THE ASSUMED UBIQUITOUS CHARACTER OF CIA IS MOST HUMOROUSLY ILLUSTRATED BY A <u>NEW YORKER</u> CARTOON OF SEVERAL YEARS PAST.

THE CARTOON SHOWS A GROUP OF NATIVES WATCHING A VOLCANO ERUPT.

THE CAPTION READS: "PASS IT ALONG. THE CIA DID IT!"

FOREIGN SENSITIVITY TOWARD INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAS ITS COUNTERPART WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. IN ADDITION TO THE

INCIDENTS MENTIONED ABOVE, YOU ARE ALL FAMILIAR WITH THE PUBLICITY GENERATED BY THE DISCLOSURE OF CIA SUPPORT TO U.S. STUDENTS AND OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH WERE DIRECTED AT OVERSEAS TARGETS. THERE HAS BEEN A RASH OF SPY LITERATURE AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS. ALL THESE HAVE COMBINED TO SENSITIZE CERTAIN SECTORS OF PUBLIC OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES.

MANY DOMESTIC CRITICS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES HAVE DEVELOPED A KIND OF KNEE-JERK REACTION. THEY DO NOT TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION THE PURPOSES OF INTELLIGENCE, AND THE GREAT CONTRIBUTION INTELLIGENCE MAKES TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES. ON THE CONTRARY, THEY IMMEDIATELY RUSH TO BELIEVE THE WORST AND ISSUE FORTH WITH BLANKET CONDEMNATIONS.

PLEASE UNDERSTAND THAT I AM NOT TRYING TO MAINTAIN
THAT MISTAKES HAVE NOT OCCURRED, OR THAT THE RISKS WE RUN
HAVE NOT OCCASIONALLY BEEN MISCALCULATED. I AM SAYING THAT
GOVERNMENT AND PRIVATE CRITICS ALIKE SHOULD TRY TO BE
OBJECTIVE AND TO KEEP THE EQUITIES -- AS WELL AS THE
OCCASIONAL DISADVANTAGES -- IN MIND WHEN THEY DISCUSS THE
SUBJECT. WE CAN BE OF SOME HELP BY CONDITIONING OUR PRIVATE
ATTITUDES ALONG THAT SAME LINE.

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ANOTHER FORM OF CRITICISM OFTEN PRODUCED BY MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL CRISES CONCERNS ACCUSATIONS OF AN "INTELLIGENCE
FAILURE." THE ERECTION OF THE BERLIN WALL, WARS AND COUPS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, THE DOMINICAN
CRISIS, THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE IN VIETNAM AND MANY OTHER
MAJOR EVENTS HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED BY CHARGES THAT U.S.
INTELLIGENCE FAILED TO PROVIDE WARNINGS.

AS YOU KNOW, INTELLIGENCE WARNING HAS, IN FACT, BEEN GIVEN PRIOR TO MANY, IF NOT MOST, OF THESE CRISES. PUTTING ASIDE THE PROBLEM OF WHETHER THE CRITICS ARE WELL INFORMED, THE CHARGE OF FAILURE USUALLY STEMS FROM ONE OF TWO FACTORS. THE FIRST INVOLVES THE INTELLIGENCE WARNING ITSELF. JUST HOW PRECISE CAN INTELLIGENCE BE EXPECTED TO BE IN PREDICTING HOSTILE ACTIONS? OBVIOUSLY IT IS DESIRABLE THAT WE GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF EXACTLY THE WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, HOW AND WHY OF THE HOSTILE ACTION OR DEVELOPMENT. THIS DEGREE OF PERFECTION HAS SELDOM BEEN ATTAINED IN THE HISTORY OF INTELLIGENCE. ONE BENDS EVERY EFFORT TO GIVE THE POLICY MAKER THIS KIND OF WARNING, BUT ONLY RARELY IS IT POSSIBLE TO PENETRATE THE ENEMY'S PROTECTIVE BARRIERS SUFFICIENTLY TO





PROVIDE A FULLY RELIABLE, DETAILED NOTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE PRECISE TIME AND NATURE OF A HOSTILE ACTION. IN THIS AREA, CRYPTOLOGY IS OUR MOST EFFECTIVE WEAPON.

THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN IS THAT IN MANY CASES OF SO-CALLED FAILURES, WE <u>HAVE</u> PROVIDED INTELLIGENCE WARNINGS,
BUT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT -- FOR VARIOUS REASONS -- HAS NOT BEEN IN A POSITION TO <u>DO</u> ANYTHING ABOUT IT. THE CONSTRAINTS OF TODAY'S WORLD SOMETIMES MAKE IT A LOSING PROPOSITION TO ACT ON WHAT WE KNOW. THIS IS CERTAINLY FRUSTRATING.

IN OTHER CASES, POLICY-MAKERS ARE UNWILLING TO ACCEPT
AN INTELLIGENCE WARNING WHICH IS NOT PALATABLE AND WHICH WOULD
REQUIRE ACTION. THIS IS THE PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENCE
CREDIBILITY. IN EITHER CASE THE UNINFORMED CRITIC CONFUSES

DISMAY, WHICH STEMS FROM OUR INABILITY TO ACT, WITH WHAT HE
THEN CALLS "SURPRISE".

ANOTHER FACTOR WE MUST FACE IS THE CONSTANTLY IMPROVING SECURITY OF OUR PRINCIPAL INTELLIGENCE TARGETS. TO A CERTAIN EXTENT THIS IS THE OLD RACE, WELL KNOWN IN MILITARY MATTERS, BETWEEN THE OFFENSE AND THE DEFENSE, AS IT APPLIES TO INTELLIGENCE.



THE DEFENSIVE ABILITIES OF OUR MAIN TARGETS SEEM TO GROW

AS THE PRESENT LIMBO BETWEEN REAL PEACE AND MAJOR WAR LENGTHENS

OUT. DURING MILITARY HOSTILITIES, INTELLIGENCE OPPORTUNITIES

TEND TO OPEN UP, AS THE ENEMY'S NEED TO ACT SWIFTLY DENIES

HIM TIME FOR ELABORATE SECURITY MEASURES.

AS WE LEAVE WORLD WAR II FURTHER BEHIND, THE SECURITY OF OUR INTELLIGENCE TARGETS BECOMES BETTER ORGANIZED AND MORE EFFECTIVE. AS A RESULT, EVER MORE EXTENSIVE, COSTLY, AND IMAGINATIVE EFFORTS ARE REQUIRED TO PENETRATE THE SECURITY BARRIERS AND TO PRODUCE HIGH LEVEL INTELLIGENCE RESULTS.

THE TRENDS I HAVE BEEN DISCUSSING SO FAR LARGELY CONCERN
THE WORLD OUTSIDE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- OUR
INTELLIGENCE TARGETS, THIRD COUNTRY GOVERNMENTS AND PEOPLES,
AND OUR CRITICS. LET US IDENTIFY A FEW TRENDS WITHIN THE
PROFESSION ITSELF.

ALTHOUGH THE FUNDS EXPENDED AND THE PERSONNEL EMPLOYED IN INTELLIGENCE PURPOSES ARE CLOSELY GUARDED, IT IS WELL UNDERSTOOD THAT BOTH HAVE BEEN STEADILY INCREASING FOR THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS. APART FROM INFLATIONARY PRESSURES AT HOME AND ABROAD, THERE ARE SEVERAL REASONS FOR THIS.

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OBVIOUSLY, WITH SUCCESSIVE PAY RAISES, OUR PERSONNEL
COSTS HAVE RISEN, AND THIS IS NO SMALL ITEM. BUT EVEN MORE
IMPORTANT HAS BEEN THE DEVELOPMENT OF TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED
SYSTEMS TO COLLECT AND EXPLOIT DATA OBTAINABLE BY
SOPHISTICATED SENSORS. THE SYSTEMS ARE LARGE AND COSTLY,
AND THEY REQUIRE HIGHLY SKILLED PERSONNEL. MANY OF THEM USE
MOBILE PLATFORMS, OR ARE DESIGNED FOR OPERATION IN UNUSUAL
LOCATIONS. THEY OFTEN GOBBLE UP VAST QUANTITIES OF DATA WHICH
REQUIRE EXPENSIVE EFFORTS FOR REDUCTION AND PROCESSING, BEFORE
THE DATA BECOME USEFUL TO INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS. THE DECISION
TO DEVELOP AND OPERATE ONE OF THESE SYSTEMS IS USUALLY A "BIG"
DECISION, INVOLVING HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND
THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS IS ONE WAY TO OVERCOME SOME OF THE PROBLEMS I REFERRED TO EARLIER, SUCH AS THE IMPROVING SECURITY AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE EFFORT OF OUR MAIN TARGETS, AND THE GROWING LIMITATIONS ON OUR USE OF THE TERRITORIES OF THIRD COUNTRIES. BUT THE IMPETUS TO OPERATE THESE SYSTEMS ALSO STEMS FROM OUR DESIRE TO PRODUCE BETTER INTELLIGENCE FOR THE POLICY MAKER, THE OPERATIONS OFFICER





AND THE FORCE PLANNER. TO DO THIS REQUIRES USING, AND MANY TIMES PUSHING, THE STATE-OF-THE ART -- AND TO DO SO IS COSTLY.

ANOTHER STIMULUS TO THE EXPANSION OF INTELLIGENCE STAFFS
AND BUDGETS IS THE GROWING INTEREST OF OUR POLICY MAKERS IN
EVERY AREA OF THE WORLD. BEFORE 1960, THE SOVIET UNION WAS THE
PRIMARY FOCUS OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE. THE SOVIET UNION AND
(MORE RECENTLY) COMMUNIST CHINA CONTINUE TO BE OUR NUMBER ONE
TARGETS, BUT THE APPETITES OF OUR CUSTOMERS NOW EXTEND TO THE
POLITICAL, MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF ALMOST ANY
COUNTRY YOU MAY CARE TO NAME. THESE APPETITES ARE GETTING
MORE VORACIOUS WITH EACH CRISIS. THUS, IT HAS BECOME
NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST A MINIMUM COLLECTION EFFORT AND
ANALYTICAL EXPERTISE ON EACH AND EVERY OUT-OF-THE-WAY COUNTRY,
AGAINST THE MOMENT WHEN IT MAY BE PROPELLED INTO THE HEADLINES THROUGH A COUP, A WAR, OR SOME OTHER NATIONAL UPHEAVAL.

THERE IS YET ANOTHER TREND AFFECTING US ALL AS A RESULT OF THE GROWING DOLLAR AND PERSONNEL COSTS OF INTELLIGENCE. I REFER HERE TO THE PRESSURES FOR ECONOMY IN INTELLIGENCE. THE REDUCTION IN PERSONNEL ABROAD IS ONE MANIFESTATION OF THIS.

I AM SURE WE AGREE THAT EACH MEMBER AGENCY IN THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY HAS OCCASIONALLY SUNK A DRY HOLE AND MAY DO SO

AGAIN IN THE FUTURE. BUT IN TODAY'S CLIMATE IT IS VITAL THAT

WE ALL BE ECONOMY-MINDED. IN PARTICULAR, WE SHOULD WORK HARD

TO ELIMINATE ACTIVITIES THAT ARE OUTMODED OR OF MARGINAL

USEFULNESS -- JUST AS HARD AS WE WORK TO ACHIEVE AN IMPORTANT

NEW ADVANCE. GIVEN THE GROWTH OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BUDGET,

CERTAINLY THE ECONOMY TREND WILL CONTINUE TO BE WITH US AND IT

IS APPROPRIATE THAT WE RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE PRESIDENT'S

ECONOMY POLICY.

NOW, WHAT ABOUT THE FRUITS OF OUR LABOR? THE TREND HERE IS THE MOST REASSURING AND SATISFYING OF ALL. IT IS MY CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAT OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE STANDS AT A LEVEL WHICH HAS NEVER BEEN SURPASSED. OUR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT IS GOOD, AND I AM CONFIDENT IT WILL CONTINUE TO IMPROVE. WE DO HAVE GAPS IN INFORMATION ON SOME OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT TARGETS, AND WE SHOULD EXPECT THAT THIS WILL CONTINUE TO BE THE CASE. OCCASIONALLY OUR INTELLIGENCE JUDGMENTS ARE FAULTY. FOR THAT MATTER, LOOKING BACK OVER THE PAST YEAR, WE KNOW THAT THE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS IN MOSCOW AND PEKING HAVE CERTAINLY SUFFERED SOME MAJOR "INTELLIGENCE FAILURES."

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SPEAKING OF OUR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT AS A WHOLE, WE HAVE SUFFICIENT FEEDBACK FROM TOP U.S. POLICY MAKERS TO KNOW THAT INTELLIGENCE IS PLAYING A ROLE OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE IN THEIR DECISION-MAKING ON MANY OF THE MOST CRITICAL ISSUES FACING OUR GOVERNMENT TODAY. THE MEMBERS OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE BOARD KNOW HOW OFTEN KEY FIGURES IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMUNITY AND OUR DEFENSE ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST USIB VIEWS ON A VARIETY OF SPECIAL SUBJECTS. THESE REQUESTS ARE FREQUENT, AND THEY BEAR ON MOST OF THE CRITICAL DECISIONS FACING OUR TOP LEADERS.

IN TAKING SATISFACTION IN THE PRESENT HIGH STATUS AND VALUE OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE EFFORT, I DO NOT MEAN TO SUGGEST THAT WE CAN AFFORD TO BE SMUG. A TRULY PROFESSIONAL GROUP AVOIDS THIS PITFALL, FOR "PRIDE GOETH BEFORE A FALL."

NOR CAN WE IN THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY AFFORD THE SHORTSIGHTEDNESS OF INDULGING WHAT I WOULD
CALL A "TRIBALISTIC" ATTITUDE OF SEEING ONLY THE PROBLEMS OR
INTERESTS OF ONE'S IMMEDIATE SHOP OR AGENCY. WE MUST WORK
HARD TO FOSTER A SPIRIT OF GENUINE COOPERATION, WHEREBY WE ALL
SEE OUR PROBLEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE TOTAL EFFORT OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. IN A WORD, WE NEED EMPATHY IN OUR

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WORK. IF WE HOLD TO THIS APPROACH, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE ALREADY RECOGNIZED AND STILL GROWING VALUE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT WILL OUTWEIGH ALL OF THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE TRENDS I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH YOU TODAY.

THUS SAITH GENERAL CUSHMAN. NOW LET ME ADD MY OWN

CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU ON THE COMPLETION OF THIS COURSE, AND LET

ME WISH YOU SUCCESS IN YOUR RESPECTIVE ASSIGNMENTS, IN DIA

AND ELSEWHERE. THE SUCCESS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

DEPENDS ON THE EFFORTS OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF US.

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FROM:

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ROOM NO. BUILDING

FORM NO. 241

REPLACES FORM 36-8

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